This paper analyzes the impact on firm behavior of the Homeland Investment Act of 2004, which provided a one-time tax holiday for the repatriation of foreign earnings by U.S. multinationals. The analysis controls for endogeneity and omitted variable bias by using instruments that identify the firms likely to receive the largest tax benefits from the holiday. Repatriations did not lead to an increase in domestic investment, employment or R&D-even for the firms that lobbied for the tax holiday stating these intentions and for firms that appeared to be financially constrained. Instead, a $1 increase in repatriations was associated with an increase of almost $1 in payouts to shareholders. These results suggest that the domestic operations of U.S. multinationals were not financially constrained and that these firms were reasonably well-governed. The results have important implications for understanding the impact of U.S. corporate tax policy on multinational firms.
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I. Introduction
The Homeland Investment Act (HIA) provided for a one-time tax holiday on the repatriation of foreign earnings by U.S.-based multinational enterprises (MNEs) 1 and was passed in 2004 as part of the American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA). Congressmen argued that it would create more than 500,000 jobs over 2 years by raising investment in the United States. Analysts at J.P. Morgan Securities estimated that businesses would increase capital spending by 2% to 3% over two years. 2 A confidential survey of firms indicated that they would primarily use the repatriated funds to pay down debt, finance capital spending, and fund research and development, venture capital, and acquisitions; 3 some firms also stated these intentions publicly. Many economists, however, argued that the tax holiday would have little impact on U.S. investment, R&D or employment. The White House's Council of Economic Advisers stated that "the repatriation provision would not produce any substantial economic benefits."
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In response to the HIA, repatriations of foreign earnings from affiliates to parents of U.S.
MNEs surged. According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. multinationals repatriated about $300 billion in 2005 after the HIA was passed, up sharply from an average of around $60 billion over the previous five years. 5 The magnitude of these repatriations exceeded most predictions.
Firms' responses to the HIA provide an opportunity to test several hypotheses about financial constraints, corporate governance, and international tax policy. The temporary tax holiday effectively reduced the cost to U.S. multinationals of accessing internal capital that was held abroad as reinvested earnings. The framers of the Act justified the tax holiday based on the premise that these firms' domestic operations were financially constrained. If this were true, repatriated cash could be invested in U.S. projects that had a positive net present value for the 1 The term "repatriation" refers to the payment of dividends by a foreign subsidiary to its U.S. parent firm. Table 7b , line 3 for distributed earnings.
2 firm based on the temporarily lower cost of internal capital but which were not profitable at the higher cost of external finance. Hubbard (1998) and Stein (2003) review the large literature on financial constraints. 6 There are reasons to be skeptical about the stated justifications for the Act because large firms are typically less constrained than small ones, and multinationals are generally thought to be less constrained than other firms. In the presence of high repatriation tax costs, however, the domestic activities of MNEs or a subset of MNEs could face constraints. Studying changes in firms' domestic investment, employment, and R&D expenditures under the HIA reveals whether the domestic operations of U.S. multinationals were in fact financially constrained, and if the reduced tax costs of accessing internal funds spurred domestic activity in accordance with the stated goal of lawmakers.
If firms are not financially constrained, then well-governed firms would return any internal capital accessed under the HIA to shareholders through mechanisms such as share repurchases or dividend payments. In the absence of financial constraints, well-governed firms would choose optimal levels of investment and employment before the tax holiday, so they would not increase expenditures on capital and labor when the holiday occurred. If firms are not well-governed, however, any internal cash accessed under the HIA could be squandered. This cash would reduce the constraints on managers and give them more freedom to pursue projects that provide a greater private benefit than shareholder benefitsuch as raising management compensation, upgrading corporate headquarters, or increasing investment in low-return projects. This possibility is discussed in Jensen (1986) , and evidence of such behavior appears in several papers, such as Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) , Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1991) , Blanchard, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1994) , Bates (2005) , and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) . This paper analyzes the effects of the HIA on payouts to shareholders and tests whether corporate governance affects the extent to which firms returned funds to shareholders.
3 Firms' responses to the HIA also have important implications for international tax policy, including implications for the effects of how the United States taxes foreign source income and for the regulation of how repatriations are spent. Altshuler and Grubert (2003) argue that U.S. multinationals are able to use tax planning strategies that allow them to effectively avoid repatriation taxes even in the absence of a tax holiday. On the other hand, several papers find that repatriation taxes significantly distort repatriation decisions. 7 Evidence that firms made extensive use of the HIA tax holiday  and in particular that those firms that took greatest advantage of the holiday had previously attempted to reduce their repatriation taxes through alternative strategies  would suggest that repatriation taxes do impose burdens, despite the availability of strategies to escape the taxes. This finding is particularly timely in view of current proposals to restrict U.S. firms' ability to defer repatriation taxes.
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A more general policy issue addressed in this paper is whether government regulation can affect firms' spending patterns. The U.S. Treasury Department issued explicit guidelines on how earnings returned to the United States could be spent. The funds had to be used for "permitted investments," which included hiring U.S. workers, U.S. investment, research and development, and certain acquisitions. Certain uses, such as executive compensation, dividends, and stock redemptions, would disqualify repatriations from the holiday. The literature on the "flypaper effect" suggests that regulations directing how funds are used have a significant impact. More specifically, this literature finds that money tends to "stick where it hits", i.e., that targeted grants have large effects on expenditures even though cash is fungible. 9 Although most papers on the flypaper effect focus on inter-government transfers, Hines and Thaler (1995) review this literature and point out similar effects in the corporate sector. How U.S. multinationals responded to the restrictions on the use of cash repatriated under the HIA provides a test of the effectiveness of these types of regulations.
The empirical analysis in this paper utilizes the most extensive data available on U.S.
multinational firms by combining information from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 7 Papers that document an effect of taxes on repatriations include Hines and Hubbard (1990) and Desai, Foley, and Hines (2007 omitted factors, such as levels of domestic cash flows, could affect both repatriations and other choices. This paper addresses these problems by instrumenting for repatriations under the HIA using firm characteristics that predict which firms are more likely to receive a large tax benefit from HIA repatriations but that are predetermined in relation to the Act. More specifically, the instruments identify firms that, prior to the HIA, faced high tax costs of repatriating funds and that shielded foreign income from U.S. taxation by using tax haven affiliates or holding companies. The first-stage results indicate that these characteristics are strong predictors of the extent to which firms took advantage of the HIA.
The second stage results and additional evidence in this paper are inconsistent with the claim that the domestic operations of MNEs were financially constrained and that the tax holiday spurred U.S. job creation or investment. More specifically, higher levels of repatriations were not associated with increased domestic capital expenditures, domestic employment compensation, or research and development (R&D) expenditures. In fact, increased repatriations in response to the HIA had small negative, but insignificant, effects on domestic employment and R&D expenditures in instrumental variable specifications. These results hold not only for the full sample of firms, but also for subsamples of firms that appear to be financially constrained and that lobbied for the Act.
Additional results from the analysis of equity provisions by parent firms to their affiliates provide further evidence that firms did not face domestic financial constraints. Before the tax holiday, firms that increased equity provisions from their parents to their affiliates repatriated less to the United States. Firms that increased parent equity provisions around the time of the tax holiday, however, had significantly higher levels of repatriations. This pattern suggests that the domestic operations of U.S. MNEs were not capital constrained and were instead providing liquidity to affiliates. These firms seem to have taken advantage of the HIA by 5 "roundtripping," that is by replacing retained earnings that would be subject to high repatriation taxes if there were no tax holiday with new paid-in capital.
Rather than being associated with increased expenditures on domestic investment or employment, repatriations were associated with significantly higher levels of shareholder payouts, mainly through share repurchases. The instrumental variable estimates imply that a $1 increase in repatriations was associated with a $0.79 increase in share repurchases and a $0.15 increase in dividends. Also, higher levels of repatriations were not associated with higher levels of management compensation. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms are well-governed on average, in the sense that they paid out the cash accessed under the HIA and did not use it to increase executive compensation or to inefficiently increase the scale or scope of firm activities. Additional results highlight the importance of corporate governance in shaping firm responses to the HIA. Increased repatriations are associated with higher payouts to shareholders only for firms with reasonably strong corporate governance as measured by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) .
The results in this paper inform policy in three ways. First, firms that employed strategies to reduce repatriation taxes tended to repatriate more under the HIA than other firms, indicating that it is not possible to eliminate the burden of repatriation taxes. 10 Second, the results on governance suggest that agency issues should be considered when designing corporate tax policy, as also argued in Chetty and Saez (2005) and Crocker and Slemrod (2005) . Finally, government regulations on how firms used the repatriated funds appear to have been ineffective. Although the results in this paper do not imply that firms violated the provisions of the HIA, it is clear that they were able to reallocate funds internally to bypass the publiclystated goals of the Act.
The HIA has already attracted considerable scholarly attention. Using more limited samples of firms and tests that do not address potential endogeneity or omitted variable problems, 10 Other studies of the HIA and of tax holidays provide further evidence of the effects of taxes on repatriations. Graham, Hanlon and Shevlin (2008a, b) provide survey evidence that taxes and accounting-expense recognition are important in repatriation decisions. Albring, Dzuranin, and Mills (2005) estimate a high tax cost of the HIA, and De Waegenaere and Sansing (2008) show theoretically how a repatriation tax holiday would increase firm value.
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Baghai (2009), Blouin and Krull (2008) and Clemons and Kinney (2007) find that firms which repatriated or reported definite plans to repatriate during the tax holiday increased share repurchases more than firms that did not repatriate, a result consistent with our findings.
Using a smaller sample drawn from the S&P 500, Brennan (2008) finds that repatriating firms did not return funds to shareholders through share repurchases, dividends or net debt buybacks. He and Baghai (2009) also find that valuations of firms that repatriated under the HIA, especially those with weak corporate governance, fell around the time of its passage.
They interpret this as evidence that investors believed that repatriated funds would be spent on activities that destroyed value. In contrast, Oler, Shevlin and Wilson (2007) find that firms with foreign earnings in low-tax jurisdictions experienced a significant increase in stock prices and market value prior to the passage of the Act. Interpreting the results of these event studies is complicated, however, because the Act was discussed for some time before it became law.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes U.S. international tax policy and the implications of the HIA. Section III describes the data, and Section IV discusses estimation issues. Section V reports the results, and Section VI concludes.
II. U.S. International Tax Policy
The United States and many other countries tax the foreign income of their residents. In order to avoid double taxation of foreign income, U.S. law grants tax credits for foreign income taxes paid abroad. U.S. MNEs are permitted to defer U.S. tax liabilities on certain foreign profits until they are repatriated. Taxes due upon repatriation are generally equal to the difference between foreign income taxes paid and tax payments that would be due if earnings were taxed at the U.S. rate. For example, if the U.S. tax rate is 35%, and a U.S. MNE earns $100 abroad and pays $20 in host country income taxes, an additional $15 would be due in U.S. taxes when the earnings are repatriated. If foreign income taxes paid exceed the amount that would be due if earnings were taxed at the U.S. rate, then no additional taxes are owed.
Total U.S. tax obligations on distributed foreign earnings are determined by worldwide averaging. This approach allows firms that pay tax rates above the U.S. tax rate in a 7 particular jurisdiction to use the foreign tax credits from this jurisdiction to shield income repatriated from low tax locations from U.S. taxation. However, these foreign tax credits cannot be used to reduce tax obligations related to income earned within the United States.
There are some limits to the extent to which firms can avoid U.S. taxation through deferral. Another common strategy to avoid repatriation taxes involves the indirect ownership of foreign affiliates, either through holding companies or through affiliates in tax havens that do 11 The early literature analyzing repatriation taxes demonstrated that they should not affect the timing of repatriations if the only alternatives are to repatriate or to reinvest foreign earnings in the foreign affiliate's operations (Sinn (1984) and Hartman (1985) ). The strategy of using foreign earnings to acquire passive assets that are held in the low-tax jurisdiction is analyzed by Weichenrieder (1996 subsidiaries, subject to a number of restrictions. 13 More specifically, the HIA allowed companies to deduct 85% of their repatriations from additional U.S. taxes for the first taxable year on or after the HIA was signed. Taxes were still due on the remaining 15% of repatriations, but firms continued to receive tax credits for foreign income taxes paid on these 12 The Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that the HIA would raise $2.8 billion in tax revenues in fiscal year 2005 but lose $3.3 billion over the 10-year period from 2005 -2014 (Kleinbard and Driessen (2008 ). 13 Other provisions of the AJCA included: a tax deduction for domestic manufacturing companies, reducing the number of income baskets to calculate a firm's credit for foreign taxes, extending "temporary" investment incentives for small businesses, allowing taxpayers in states with no income tax to deduct sales taxes from their federal taxes and a series of tax breaks to special interest groups (from tobacco farmers and cruise-ship owners to Native Alaskan whaling captains and bow-and-arrow makers). subsidiaries. This amount of qualifying repatriations was also reduced by the total debt outstanding from the foreign subsidiary to related parties and by the amount of the increase in related-party debt between the U.S. firm and its foreign subsidiary. These last qualifications were intended to prevent companies from borrowing abroad or from their U.S. parent companies in order to fund repatriations at the lower tax rate.
Finally, repatriations had to be used for certain domestic activities in accordance with a domestic investment plan in order to qualify for the tax holiday. The investment plan had to be approved by the company's president, CEO, or a comparable official before the repatriations were paid, and then subsequently approved by the company's board of directors or management or executive committee. Investments that were "permitted uses" for the repatriated funds included: hiring and training domestic workers, domestic infrastructure and capital investments, research and development, financial stabilization (including debt repayment) for the purposes of U.S. job retention or creation, certain acquisitions of business entities with U.S. assets, advertising and marketing, and acquisition of rights to intangible property. Expenditures that were explicitly not permitted uses for repatriations receiving the tax holiday were: executive compensation, intercompany transactions, dividends and other shareholder distributions, stock redemptions, portfolio investments, debt instruments, and tax payments. Some economists, such as Clausing (2005), questioned the effectiveness of specifying "permitted uses" for repatriations. She argues that money is fungible and firms could simply relabel existing projects that met the qualifying criteria as "new" to qualify for the tax deduction and then have the freedom to use the repatriated cash in any way.
Even Compustat data are also used to create the other instrument for repatriations and to compute the control variables. The second instrument measures the tax costs of repatriating foreign earnings and is defined in Section IV. Firm leverage, one of the controls, is measured as the ratio of total debt to the sum of total debt and the market value of equity. Firm investment opportunities are controlled for using a proxy for Tobin's q, defined as the ratio of the book value of firm assets plus the market value of firm equity less the book value of firm equity to the book value of firm assets. The final controls, firm cash holdings and firm profitability, are measured as consolidated cash and consolidated net income, respectively, both as a ratio to consolidated assets.
Finally, the analysis also employs firm-level measures of financial constraints, lobbying activity, and governance drawn from a variety of sources. Three proxies for financial constraints are taken from Compustat. The Kaplan-Zingales index is estimated following Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003) by using the coefficient estimates from Kaplan and Zingales (1997) . 18 The bottom one-third of firms based on this index is classified as financially 
IV. Estimation and First-Stage Results
The empirical analysis in this paper exploits differences in how the HIA affects the tax costs of repatriating across firms to explore how firms respond when they face lower costs of accessing one type of internal capital. This section discusses the estimation strategy and the next section tests for effects on several outcome variables, including domestic capital expenditures, domestic employment compensation, R&D expenditures, parent leverage, firm expansion, CEO compensation, dividends to shareholders, and share repurchases.
14 A simple OLS specification to estimate the impact of dividend repatriations on each of these outcome variables would take the following form:
where V it measures the outcome variable of interest for firm i in year t, R it is repatriations by firm i in year t, X it is a vector of controls, μ i is a firm effect, δ t is a year effect, and ε it is the error term. In order to control for correlations that might be induced by changes in firm size through time, the outcome variables, repatriations, and control variables are scaled.
Specifically, repatriations and all measured outcome variables are scaled by beginning-ofperiod consolidated firm assets.
This general estimating framework has two potential problems, endogeneity and omitted These are primarily driven by the location of foreign investments and economic conditions and tax policy in those locations, factors that are unlikely to be jointly determined with repatriations. Second, the use of tax haven affiliates and holding company affiliates in 2004 is also assumed to be exogenous to the repatriation decision. These structures take a considerable amount of time to establish, so this assumption seems reasonable. To more formally test the strength of these instruments, Table 2 reports first-stage regressions.
Column 1 presents results of regressing the instruments on dividend repatriations scaled by lagged consolidated assets with no controls. The specification in column 2 includes the full set of controls. All regressions include firm and year fixed effects. The tables report the within-firm R 2 and heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that have been adjusted for clustering at the firm level. In each specification the coefficients on the instruments are positive and highly significant, implying that firms with a high tax cost of repatriating earnings and firms that have an affiliate located in a tax haven or classified as a holding company increased repatriations significantly more than other firms in 2005. The last row of (1) and is similar to those used in previous studies of the impact of the HIA. The second is an instrumental variables (IV) specification that uses the two instruments for repatriations. Both specifications include firm and year fixed effects and report heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses.
The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 is U.S. capital expenditures scaled by lagged firm consolidated assets. The 0.0212 coefficient on repatriations in column 1 is small in magnitude and insignificant. It implies that increases in repatriations are not significantly correlated with increases in domestic capital expenditures over the sample period. In the IV specification in column 2, the coefficient on repatriations is close to zero and remains insignificant. This estimate implies that those firms that, because of their characteristics, repatriated an extra $1 of earnings from abroad under the HIA invested less than one cent 21 The large response suggests that for many firms, the effective U.S. tax burden on foreign income exceeds the 5.25% rate available during the holiday (adjusted appropriately for foreign tax credits). However, it does not reveal how much larger the burden is and so is not necessarily inconsistent with the claim that the effective U.S. tax burden on foreign income is quite low (e.g. Grubert and Mutti (2001)). Also, for the same reason, it is not necessarily the case that the tax holiday provided a large windfall gain to U.S. MNEs or their shareholders. The gain only reflects the difference between the prior effective tax burden and the 5.25% HIA rate (adjusted for foreign tax credits) and so may be quite small (as suggested by the relatively small estimates of the long-run revenue loss (Kleinbard and Driessen (2008)).
more domestically. The small coefficient and the standard error of 0.1272 rule out the possibility that increased repatriations have a large positive effect on domestic investment.
These specifications include controls for the determinants of investment that are standard in previous work. The coefficient on leverage is negative, as in Lang, Ofek, and Stulz (1996) and other studies. The coefficient on lagged Tobin's q is positive, as is the coefficient on lagged profitability. Lagged cash is insignificant in explaining investment.
The specifications in columns 3 through 6 of Table 3 Table 4 show that there was also no significant impact of higher repatriations on CEO compensation according to either estimation technique.
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The tests presented in Table 5 analyze the effects of repatriations on firm payouts to shareholders defined as the sum of dividends and share repurchases. The coefficient on repatriations is positive and marginally significant in explaining payouts scaled by lagged assets in the OLS specification in column 1. The IV results in column 2, however, suggest that the impact of repatriations under the HIA on payouts is larger and statistically significant.
This estimate implies that a $1 increase in repatriations under the HIA spurred a $0.92 increase in payouts to shareholders.
In order to understand better the relation between repatriations and shareholder payouts, columns 3 through 6 of Table 5 repeat the analysis in columns 1 and 2, but break payouts into its two components: dividends and share repurchases. The coefficients on repatriations are positive in each column but only significant at the 5% level for the IV results for share repurchases. This indicates that the main effect of higher repatriations on payouts occurred through increased share repurchases instead of increased dividend payments. Moreover, the 0.7893 coefficient on repatriations in column 6 suggests that a $1 increase in repatriations under the HIA increased repurchases by $0.79. This series of results suggests that the primary domestic impact of the repatriations under the HIA tax holiday was to increase share repurchases. This use of the repatriations was not one of the political justifications for the holiday and was explicitly specified as not being a "permitted use" of the cash repatriated under the lower tax rate.
Two aspects of the results in Table 5 deserve comment. First, the OLS estimates of the effect of repatriations are considerably smaller than the IV results. As explained in Section IV, the OLS results could be biased downward for a number of reasons. For example, domestic cash flows are not observed, and if payouts were higher and repatriations were lower when these flows are higher, this set of relationships would generate a negative bias on the repatriation 20 coefficient. The inclusion of year and firm fixed effects also has a large impact on estimates in the OLS specifications. They absorb most of the variation in repatriations, leaving little scope to identify any effects. In contrast, the IV specifications identify effects using heterogeneity in 2005 repatriations that is induced by differences in how firms responded to the HIA. When firm and year fixed effects and controls are omitted from the OLS specification, the coefficient on repatriations is larger; a simple OLS regression of payouts on repatriations, both scaled by lagged consolidated assets, with no controls or firm and year fixed effects yields a coefficient estimate of 0.4882 on repatriations with a standard error of 0.0811.
Second, although the two forms of shareholder payouts analyzed in Table 5 -share repurchases and dividends-are equivalent in simple models of the firm without taxes and with perfect information, it is not surprising that firms chose to return the repatriated cash to shareholders mainly through share repurchases instead of dividends. The ability to access foreign cash at a lower cost was transitory. Because share repurchases do not imply as much of a commitment to make regular distributions as dividend payments, firms would have been more likely to respond to this temporary change by repurchasing shares instead of paying dividends.
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The fact that firms increased payouts to shareholders primarily through repurchases rather than dividends also suggests that this behavior was not simply a delayed response to the 2003 dividend tax cut. In 2003, Congress enacted the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act, reducing the tax rate on most dividend income to 15%. Chetty and Saez (2005) show that this reform led to a substantial increase in dividend payments by U.S. firms. The payout response to the HIA appears to be a distinct phenomenon, however, as it primarily took the form of repurchases rather than dividends.
Taken together, the results in tables 3-5 suggest that repatriations did not alleviate any financial constraints. Firms that valued the tax holiday the most and took greatest advantage of it did not increase domestic investment or employment, instead returning virtually all of the cash they repatriated to shareholders. 24 This behavior is consistent with simple models of the firm which show that if firms are not capital constrained and are well-governed, they will return excess cash to shareholders. Managers do not appear to have used the repatriated cash to increase management compensation, acquisitions, or investment or to have taken any actions that are symptomatic of certain types of agency problems. Closer examination of the types of firms that chose to repatriate and analysis of how different kinds of firms responded to the HIA offers further insight on these issues.
B. Further Evidence on Financial Constraints
The previous section shows that firms did not increase domestic investment when they were able to access retained earnings abroad at lower costs, a finding which is inconsistent with the view argued by many advocates of the HIA that firms were financially constrained. To further explore the validity of this view, this section extends this analysis by considering the prevalence of financial constraints among U.S. multinationals. It analyzes if such constraints affected investment responses to the HIA and examines if firms engaged in "roundtripping."
If U.S. MNEs were not financially constrained at the time of the HIA, they should have been able to raise new capital at a reasonable cost if they needed domestic liquidity; they would not be reliant on capital held abroad. Table 6 presents statistics on the prevalence of financial constraints among three sets of firms: the full set of Compustat firms and the subsets of multinational and non-multinational firms. These statistics are computed using 2004
Compustat data, and multinationals are defined as those firms that report pretax foreign income (data item 273). The three measures of constraints, defined in Section III, are based on the Kaplan-Zingales index, whether or not the firm makes payouts to shareholders, and the firm's credit rating. For each of these measures, multinationals appear less constrained than other firms in Compustat.
A substantial fraction of multinationals are classified as being constrained using each measure, and these firms might have increased investment in response to the HIA.
Alternatively, common measures of financial constraints may not be appropriate for measuring if MNEs were domestically constrained because of the tax costs of accessing foreign earnings. It is possible that firms that lobbied extensively for the Act were financially constrained domestically in a way that is difficult to observe using consolidated firm data.
These firms may have responded to the tax holiday in a manner that is consistent with the stated intentions of lawmakers.
The analysis presented in Table 7 considers these possibilities by repeating the test presented in Column 2 of The estimates indicate that no matter which measure of financial constraints is used, firms classified as being constrained did not significantly increase U.S. investment-the same result as for the full sample of firms. Repeating this analysis to test for effects on U.S. employment compensation and R&D expenditures yields the same finding. Repatriations under the HIA are not associated with increased domestic investment, employment or R&D activity, even for U.S. multinational companies that appear to be financially constrained.
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Many firms lobbied extensively for a lower tax on repatriations, and as part of this lobbying effort, they claimed they would use the repatriations to increase investment and R&D and hire workers. For example, the "Homeland Investment Coalition" (HIC) wrote a letter to the Chairman of the key tax-writing committee in the House of Representatives and argued that a tax holiday on repatriations would "benefit the U.S. economy by: increasing domestic investment in plant, equipment, R&D and job creation..." 26 To test whether these firms may have been constrained in a way not captured by traditional measures, the bottom panel of Table 7 repeats the analysis in the top panel of the table, but Column 2 of Table 8 repeats the same regression with the four standard control variables used in the other regressions, and columns 3 and 4 report the same regressions except measure equity provisions from the U.S. parent to the foreign affiliate in the current and prior year instead of just the current year. In column 4, the coefficient on the Positive Equity Provision
Dummy is now negative and significant, and the coefficient on this dummy interacted with the 2005 Dummy is positive and significant. An F-test reveals that the sum of these coefficients is also positive and significant. These results imply that U.S. multinationals were engaging in "roundtripping"; they were injecting capital from their U.S. parents into their foreign affiliates just as they were repatriating funds to the U.S. from their foreign affiliates at the lower tax rate. Firms that had domestic operations that were financially constrained 
C. Further Evidence on Governance
Examining how different kinds of firms responded to the HIA also provides information on the role of corporate governance. Agency theory suggests that firms which are poorly governed could use the cash accessed at a lower cost during the tax holiday in ways that do not maximize the return to shareholders. Such cash could reduce constraints on managers and
give them more freedom to pursue projects that provide private benefits. Even if less wellgoverned firms did not spend the repatriated cash immediately, they would be more likely to retain the cash instead of paying it out to shareholders, possibly in order to have more freedom to pursue projects that do not maximize value in the future.
To test if firm governance affected how firms responded to the tax holiday, Table 9 were repatriated by firms with weak governance, they are consistent with the hypothesis that when well-governed firms that are not financially constrained gain access to an internal source of cash, they return it to shareholders.
VI. Conclusion
This paper analyzes how firms responded to the temporary reduction in the tax costs of Third, the results in this paper have important implications for U.S. international tax policy.
Discussion of reforming the U.S. tax code often includes a debate on whether reducing or eliminating the taxation of foreign earnings for U.S. multinationals would have any effect.
Some commentators argue that changes to repatriation taxes would have little impact because there are numerous ways around these taxes. However, the substantial impact of the HIA on 27 repatriations -especially among firms that appear to have previously attempted to reduce their repatriation taxes through tax planning strategies -indicates that the relatively high U.S.
tax rate, coupled with the ability to defer paying taxes on foreign earnings until they are repatriated, provide incentives for firms to keep foreign profits abroad.
Fourth, the results do not provide evidence of a "flypaper" effect for firms. A key goal of the HIA -and the broader series of tax changes in the AJCA -was to promote investment and employment in the United States. The HIA and corresponding regulations included specific guidelines on how cash repatriated at the lower tax rate could be used in order to ensure that repatriations were mainly used to further these goals. This paper clearly shows, however, that these guidelines were ineffective in achieving these specific goals. Estimates imply that firms returned almost all of the repatriated cash to shareholders -a use that was explicitly not permitted. It is important to emphasize that the results do not imply that firms violated any of the provisions of the HIA. Rather, they reflect the fact that cash is fungible and that a tax policy which reduces the cost of accessing a particular type of capital will have difficulty affecting how that capital is used. This interpretation is supported by survey evidence in Although the HIA does not appear to have spurred the domestic investment and employment of firms that used the tax holiday to repatriate earnings from abroad, it may still have benefited the U.S. economy in other ways. The tax holiday encouraged U.S. multinationals to repatriate roughly $300 billion of foreign earnings and pay most of these earnings to shareholders. Presumably these shareholders either reinvested these funds or used them for consumption. 28 Either of these activities could have an effect on U.S. growth, investment, and employment.
28 See Auerbach and Hassett (1991) and Poterba (1991) for evidence on the extent to which shareholders consume out of corporate payouts. The HIA primarily led to a change in the timing of payouts to shareholders, but there is some evidence that the timing of income may affect consumption, as in Shapiro and Slemrod (1995) . Table 1 Descriptive Statistics
Notes: This table provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis that follows. Many of these are scaled by lagged consolidated assets, which measures total firm assets. Repatriations are earnings repatriated from foreign affiliates to their parent. U.S. Capital Expenditures measures U.S. MNE investment in the United States, and U.S. Employment Compensation is the value of cash and benefit payments to U.S. employees. R&D is the aggregate research and development expenditures of a firm. Change in Parent Debt is calculated as the first difference of the sum of parent company liabilities. Change in Consolidated Net PPE is the first difference of aggregate firm net property, plant, and equipment. CEO compensation includes salary, bonus, and the value of stock and option grants. Dividends measure cash dividends paid by firms to shareholders, and repurchases measure purchases of common and preferred stock. Payouts are equal to the sum of dividends and repurchases. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to the sum of total debt and the market value of equity. Tobin's q is calculated as the ratio of the book value of firm assets plus the market value of firm equity less the book value of firm equity to the book value of firm assets. Industry median values of Tobin's q are used if firm specific ones are unavailable. Profitability is calculated as the ratio of consolidated net income to consolidated assets.
Dependent Variable: Leverage is the ratio of total debt to the sum of total debt and the market value of equity. Tobin's q is calculated as the ratio of the book value of firm assets plus the market value of firm equity less the book value of firm equity to the book value of firm assets. Industry median values of Tobin's q are used if firm specific ones are unavailable. Lagged Cash/Lagged Assets measures the lagged ratio of consolidated cash holdings to consolidated cash. Profitability is calculated as the ratio of consolidated net income to consolidated assets. Each specification is an OLS specification that includes firm and year fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that correct for clustering at the firm level appear in parentheses. F-statistic for Instruments indicates the results of Wald tests for the joint significance of the instruments following Stock and Yogo (2005) . ** and * denote significance at the 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1-2 is the ratio of domestic capital expenditures by U.S. MNEs to lagged consolidated assets. In columns 3-4 it is the ratio of U.S. employment compensation to lagged consolidated assets, and in columns 5-6 it is research and development expenditures scaled by lagged consolidated assets. Repatriations/Lagged Assets is the earnings repatriated from foreign affiliates to their parent scaled by lagged consolidated assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to the sum of total debt and the market value of equity. Tobin's q is calculated as the ratio of the book value of firm assets plus the market value of firm equity less the book value of firm equity to the book value of firm assets. Industry median values of Tobin's q are used if firm specific ones are unavailable. Lagged Cash/Lagged Assets measures the lagged ratio of consolidated cash holdings to consolidated cash. Profitability is calculated as the ratio of consolidated net income to consolidated assets. Each specification includes firm and year fixed effects. The specifications in columns 1, 3, and 5 are OLS specifications, and the specifications in columns 2, 4, and 6 are IV specifications that instrument for Repatriations/Lagged Assets using the High Table 4 The Effects of Repatriations on Parent Debt, Consolidated Net PPE, and CEO Compensation
Lagged Leverage
First-Stage Regressions
Repatriations/Lagged Assets Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1-2 is the first difference of parent liabilities scaled by lagged consolidated assets. In columns 3-4 it is the first difference of consolidated net property, plant, and equipment scaled by lagged consolidated assets, and in columns 5-6 it is CEO compensation, including salary, bonus, and the value of stock and option grants, scaled by lagged consolidated assets. Repatriations/Lagged Assets is the earnings repatriated from foreign affiliates to their parent scaled by lagged consolidated assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to the sum of total debt and the market value of equity. Tobin's q is calculated as the ratio of the book value of firm assets plus the market value of firm equity less the book value of firm equity to the book value of firm assets. Industry median values of Tobin's q are used if firm specific ones are unavailable. Lagged Cash/Lagged Assets measures the lagged ratio of consolidated cash holdings to consolidated cash. Profitability is calculated as the ratio of consolidated net income to consolidated assets. Each specification includes firm and year fixed effects. The specifications in columns 1, 3, and 5 are OLS specifications, and the specifications in columns 2, 4, and 6 are IV specifications that instrument for Repatriations/Lagged Assets using the High The dependent variable in columns 3-4 is the ratio of cash dividends to lagged consolidated assets; in columns 5-6 it is the ratio of repurchases of common and preferred shares to lagged consolidated assets, and in columns 1-2 it is the sum of these two. Repatriations/Lagged Assets is the earnings repatriated from foreign affiliates to their parent scaled by lagged consolidated assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to the sum of total debt and the market value of equity. Tobin's q is calculated as the ratio of the book value of firm assets plus the market value of firm equity less the book value of firm equity to the book value of firm assets. Industry median values of Tobin's q are used if firm specific ones are unavailable. Lagged Cash/Lagged Assets measures the lagged ratio of consolidated cash holdings to consolidated cash. Profitability is calculated as the ratio of consolidated net income to consolidated assets. Each specification includes firm and year fixed effects. The specifications in columns 1, 3, and 5 are OLS specifications, and the specifications in columns 2, 4, and 6 are IV specifications that instrument for Repatriations/Lagged Assets using the High Tax Costs of Repatriations interacted with the 2005 Dummy and the Haven or Holding Company Dummy interacted with the 2005 Dummy. The High Tax Costs of Repatriation Dummy is computed using 2004 data by first subtracting foreign taxes paid from the product of a firm's foreign pretax income and the U.S. statutory corporate tax rate. Then the maximum of this difference or zero is scaled by total firm assets. For firms with a ratio above the median sample value, the dummy is set equal to one, and it is set equal to zero otherwise. The Haven or Holding Company Dummy is equal to one for firms that, in 2004, either have operations in a tax haven or use a holding company abroad and is otherwise equal to zero. The 2005 Dummy is equal to one in 2005 and zero in other years. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that correct for clustering at the firm level appear in parentheses. ** and * denote significance at the 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Notes: The dependent variable is the earnings repatriated from foreign affiliates to their parent scaled by lagged consolidated assets. Positive Equity Provision Dummy measures parent firm investments of new equity abroad. In columns 1 and 2 it is equal to one if the parent increased its equity investment in the year repatriations are measured and is otherwise equal to zero. In columns 3 and 4, it is equal to one if the parent increased its equity investment in the year repatriations are measured or the year before and is otherwise equal to zero. The 2005 Dummy is equal to one in 2005 and zero in other years. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to the sum of total debt and the market value of equity. Tobin's q is calculated as the ratio of the book value of firm assets plus the market value of firm equity less the book value of firm equity to the book value of firm assets. Industry median values of Tobin's q are used if firm specific ones are unavailable. Lagged Cash/Lagged Assets measures the lagged ratio of consolidated cash holdings to consolidated cash. Profitability is calculated as the ratio of consolidated net income to consolidated assets. Each specification is an OLS specification that includes firm and year fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that correct for clustering at the firm level appear in parentheses. ** and * denote significance at the 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Table 9 Governance and the Effects of Repatriations on U.S. Capital Expenditures, CEO Compensation, and Payouts Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the ratio of domestic capital expenditures by U.S. MNEs to lagged consolidated assets. In columns 3 and 4, it is CEO compensation, including salary, bonus, and the value of stock and option grants, scaled by lagged consolidated assets, and in columns 5 and 6, it is the sum of cash dividends and repurchases of common and preferred shares scaled by lagged consolidated assets. Repatriations/Lagged Assets is the earnings repatriated from foreign affiliates to their parent scaled by lagged consolidated assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to the sum of total debt and the market value of equity. Tobin's q is calculated as the ratio of the book value of firm assets plus the market value of firm equity less the book value of firm equity to the book value of firm assets. Industry median values of Tobin's q are used if firm specific ones are unavailable. Lagged Cash/Lagged Assets measures the lagged ratio of consolidated cash holdings to consolidated cash. Profitability is calculated as the ratio of consolidated net income to consolidated assets. Each specification includes firm and year fixed effects. The specifications are IV specifications that instrument for Repatriations/Lagged Assets using the High Tax Costs of Repatriations interacted with the 2005 Dummy and the Haven or Holding Company Dummy interacted with the 2005 Dummy. The High Tax Costs of Repatriation Dummy is computed using 2004 data by first subtracting foreign taxes paid from the product of a firm's foreign pretax income and the U.S. statutory corporate tax rate. Then the maximum of this difference or zero is scaled by total firm assets. For firms with a ratio above the median sample value, the dummy is set equal to one, and it is set equal to zero otherwise. The Haven or Holding Company Dummy is equal to one for firms that, in 2004, either have operations in a tax haven or use a holding company abroad and is otherwise equal to zero. The 2005 Dummy is equal to one in 2005 and zero in other years. The sample in columns 1, 3, and 5 includes poorly governed firms, or firms with values of governance, as measured in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) , that are equal to or exceed 12. Firms with stronger governance comprise the sample employed in columns 2, 4, and 6. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that correct for clustering at the firm level appear in parentheses. ** and * denote significance at the 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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